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The Constitutionality of Current Crime
Victimization Statutes: A Survey
INTRODUCTION
In 1977, the New York State legislature enacted the country's
first crime victimization statute.' The statute was proposed in re-
sponse to public outcry resulting from the offer of a book and
movie deal to serial killer David Berkowitz, the self-dubbed "Son
of Sam.''2 Since then, almost every state in the United States has
enacted its own "Son of Sam" law. Such statutes are designed for
the dual purpose of compensating crime victims and preventing
1. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982).
2. See Robert D. McFadden, Suspect in "Son of Sam" Murders Arrested in Yonkers;
Police Say .44 Caliber Weapon is Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1977, at Al.
3. See ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to -207
(1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§
9101-9106 (1987 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to -32 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 351-81 to -88 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 145 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-18-7-1 to -6 (Bums 1992 & Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to -7321 (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831
to :1839 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (Supp. 1993); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768
(West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.68 (West Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103 to -104 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1835 to -1841
(1987 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.007 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4B-26 to -30 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie
1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 17 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 180-7.18 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 15-59-40 to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-1
to -14 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 8309, §§ 1-18 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200-
.280 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-40-
101 to -119 (1988). The following states have not enacted crime victimization statutes
as of this writing: Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.
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criminals from profiting from their criminal actions by seizing any
assets, profits or proceeds earned by a criminal defendant.4
New York's "Son of Sam" law created the Crime Victims
Compensation Board of New York ("Crime Victims Board"),
which was responsible for reviewing all contracts entered into by
criminal defendants and for seizing all proceeds that were earned
as a result of any reenactment of their criminal activities or of their
"thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime."
5
Such proceeds were maintained by the Crime Victims Board in an
escrow account and distributed to crime victims when a monetary
judgment was obtained against the criminal defendant.6
New York's statute has been applied in a number of cases since
its enactment.7 However, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the New York State Crime Victims Board,8 the United States Su-
preme Court held that New York's statute violated the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.9 The Court found that the
statute was not narrowly tailored to the compelling state interests
of compensating crime victims and preventing criminals from prof-
iting from their crimes because of the statute's overbroad definition
of a "person convicted of a crime" and because the statute placed
a financial burden on criminal authors based on the content of their
speech.'°
The constitutionality of all crime victimization statutes has been
4. See, e.g., 1977 N.Y. ST. LEGiS. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Samuel R. Gold);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9101 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-26 (West 1986); see
also infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
Crime victimization statutes use similar, but not identical, terms to describe the
perpetrator of a crime. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(e)(1) (1990) ("offender");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9102(3) (Supp. 1992) ("person convicted of a crime"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(d) (Supp. 1993) ("criminally responsible person"). This Note
will use the term "criminal defendant" unless otherwise specified.
5. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
6. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
8. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
9. The First Amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. 112 S. Ct. at 508-12; see infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
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seriously jeopardized by the Simon & Schuster decision because
most states had adopted statutes very similar to New York's legis-
lation. 1 Several states, including New York, have amended their
crime victimization statutes in an attempt to comply with the Simon
& Schuster decision.' 2 However, most states have allowed their
current laws to stand.13  The validity of the latter statutes is in
doubt. 14
Although the Simon & Schuster decision has generated a great
deal of commentary, 5 no commentator has surveyed every crime
11. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982) with statutes cited supra
note 3.
12. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9101-9106 (Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §
910.15 (West 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 217.007 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-368 (Michie Supp. 1993). But see IND. CODE ANN. § 12-18-7-1 to -
6 (Bums Supp. 1993) (repealing IND. CODE ANN. § 12-18-7-1 to -6 (Bums 1992)).
13. See ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 to -84 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to -207
(1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512
(West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-14-30 to -32 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 351-81 to -88 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725,
para. 145 (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7319 to -7321 (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831
to :1839 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, §§ 1-8 (Law. Co-op.
1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.68 (West Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1993); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103 to -104
(1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1835 to -1841 (1987 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
52:4B-26 to -30 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275 (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18
(1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-1 to -12 (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-59-40
to -80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-28A-1 to -14
(1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
8309, §§ 1-18 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5 (1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.200-.280 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp.
1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to -119 (1988).
14. See discussion infra parts III-IV.
15. For discussion of the Supreme Court decision in Simon & Schuster, see Mark A.
Conrad, New York's New "Son of Sam" Law-Does It Effectively Protect the Rights of
Crime Victims to Seek Redress from Their Perpetrators?, 3 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA &
INTELL. PROP. L.F. 27 (1992); Mark Conrad, The Demise of New York's "Son of Sam"
Law-The Supreme Court Upholds Convicts' Rights To Sell Their Stories, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
1994]
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victimization statute in the country. This Note will analyze every
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 28; Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and
the Press Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REV. 493 (1992); Jacqui Gold Grunfeld, Docudramas: The
Legality of Producing Fact-Based Dramas-What Every Producer's Attorney Should
Know, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 483 (1992); Elliot M. Mincberg, The Supreme
Court and the First Amendment: The 1991-1992 Term, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1
(1992); Benedict J. Caiola & Esther Oz, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Board- "Crime Goes Hollywood"-The Striking Down
of the "Son of Sam" Statute, 14 WHITTIER L, REV. 859 (1993); Karen J. Folb, Comment,
Constitutional Law-First' Amendment Challenge,. to New York's "Son of Sam"
Law-Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board,
112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 697 (1992); Kelly Franks, Note, "Son of
Sam" Laws After Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board: Free Speech Versus Victims' Rights, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
595 (1992); Douglas J. Fryer, Note, Bearing the Burden of Strict Scrutiny in the Wake of
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board: A
Constitutional Analysis of Michigan's "Son of Sam" Law, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
191 (1992); Ralph W. Johnson, III, Comment, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Board: The Demise of New York's Son of Sam Law and
the Decision That Could Have Been, 2 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F. 193
(1992); Connie Koshiol, Comment, Strict Scrutiny Sounds the Death Knell for New York's
Son of Sam Law, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 599 (1993); Andrew Michael Lauri & Patricia M.
Schaubeck, Note, Like Father Like Son? The Constitutionality of New York's Son of Sam
Law, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 279 (1992); William E. Lawrence, Note, Consti-
tutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Crime May Pay: New York's Son of Sam Law Found
Unconstitutional, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 673 (1992); Michele C. Meske, Note,
Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Crime Victims' Dilemma After Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 1001 (1992); Lisa Ann Morelli, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
New York State Crime Victims Board: How Characterization of a Speech Regulation
Can Effectively Destroy a Legitimate Law, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 651 (1993); Jon Allyn
Soderberg, Note, Son of Sam Laws: A Victim of the First Amendment?, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 629 (1992); Adam Robert Tschorn, Beyond Son of Sam: Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, and a Constitutionally Valid
Alternative to New York Executive Law Section 632-a, 17 VT. L. REV. 321 (1992); Lori
K. Zavack, Note, Can States Enact Constitutional "Son of Sam" Laws After Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 37 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 701 (1993); Elizabeth Buroker Coffin, Case Note, Constitutional Law:
Content-Based Regulations on Speech: A Comparison of the Categorization and Balanc-
ing Approaches to Judicial Scrutiny-Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New
York State Crime Victims Board, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 593 (1993); Melissa M.
Erlemeier, Case Note, The First Amendment Prevails Over Crime Victim Compensation:
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1301 (1993); Carol M. Grebb, Recent Decisions, 31 DUQ. L. REV.
401 (1993); Tanya Herrera, Recent Development, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 567
(1993); Kevin S Reed, Recent Developments, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1060 (1992).
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state crime victimization statute and determine which comply with
the Simon & Schuster decision. Part I will review the legislative
history of New York's original crime victimization statute, the
Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster, and New York's
amended statute. Part II will discuss generally the provisions that
are common to the majority of the nation's crime victimization
statutes. Part II will address the crime victimization statutes that
contain unconstitutionally overbroad definitions of a criminal de-
fendant and the statutes which have amended this definition to
comply with Simon & Schuster. Part IV will examine those stat-
utes which unconstitutionally single out the speech of criminal
authors and place a financial burden on that speech. This Note will
conclude that forty-one out of the forty-five current state crime vic-
timization statutes in the country are unconstitutional under Simon
& Schuster because such statutes are not narrowly tailored to serve
the compelling state interests in compensating crime victims and
preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes.
I. SIMON & SCHUSTER AND NEW YORK'S "SON OF SAM" LAW
A. Overview of New York's Original "Son of Sam" Law
In August 1977, the New York City Police Department arrested
David Berkowitz, the self-identified "Son of Sam" killer.1 6 The
realization that Berkowitz would profit from his crimes by contrib-
uting to a book or movie was appalling to many.' 7 As a result,
New York State Senator Samuel R. Gold proposed legislation that
would prevent criminals, such as Berkowitz, from profiting from
their crimes. 8 Gold stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an
16. See McFadden, supra note 2.
17. See Sam Roberts, Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1987, § 7, at 1. No one believed that Berkowitz's random slayings were motivated
by a book or movie deal. "But the possibility of his reaping profits from the murders
seemed appalling, and the general stampede by authors, publishers and producers to
record and buy the recollections and memoirs of murderers and other criminals had
become unseemly at best." Id.
18. 1977 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Samuel R. Gold).
1994]
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individual, such as the forty-four caliber killer [Berkowitz],
can expect to receive large sums of money for his story
once he is captured while five [sic] people are dead, other
people were injured as a result of his conduct. This bill
would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the vic-
tim must be more important than the criminal.' 9
As a result, the New York State legislature enacted section 632-a
of the Executive Law in 1977.20 The statute required that any
contract which was entered into with a person accused or convicted
of a crime and which related to the reenactment of such crime must
be submitted to the Crime Victims Board.2' A "person convicted
19. 1977 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Samuel R. Gold).
Berkowitz murdered six people and wounded seven others. Brian Katz, Inmate 78A-1976
Berkowitz, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 7, 1993, at 6. Furthermore, the Declaration of policy
and legislative intent of New York Executive Law states:
The legislature recognizes that many innocent persons suffer personal physical
injury or death as a result of criminal acts. Such persons or their dependents
may thereby suffer disability, incur financial hardships, or become dependent
upon public assistance. The legislature finds and determines that there is a need
for government financial assistance for such victims of crime. Accordingly, it
is the legislature's intent that aid, care and support be provided by the state, as
a matter of grace, for such victims of crime.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1982).
20. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982). Ironically, the law did not apply
to David Berkowitz because he had been declared mentally incompetent to stand trial.
Roberts, supra note 17, at 1. Section 632-a(6) of the Executive Law required that in a
situation where an individual "who is unfit to proceed as a result of mental disease or
defect because such person lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or
to assist in his own defense," the Crime Victims Board shall bring an action of interplead-
er to determine the disposition of the escrow account. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(6)
(McKinney 1982); see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 1006 (McKinney 1963) (setting forth
procedure for bringing an action of interpleader).
21. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982). Section 632(a)(1) of the statute
provided in pertinent part:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity
contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person,
accused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of
such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phono-
graph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind,
or from the expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings,
opinions or emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract
to the [Bloard and pay over the [B]oard any moneys which would otherwise,
by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so accused or convicted or
[Vol. 4:929
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of a crime" was defined as any individual convicted of a crime at
trial or by the entry of a plea of guilty as well as "any person who
has voluntarily and intelligently admitted the commission of a
crime for which such person is not prosecuted. 22
Section 632-a further required that any proceeds owed to the
accused or convicted individual for reenactments of their crime be
turned over to the Crime Victims Board.23 The Board would then
deposit this money in escrow accounts for the benefit of crime
victims if the crime were committed by a convicted individual or
an accused person who is eventually convicted.24 Crime victims
had five years to bring a civil action to recover a money judgment
against criminal defendants or their representatives. If a money
judgment was obtained, the crime victim would be compensated
from the funds in an escrow account maintained by the Board.26
B. Simon & Schuster
Section 632-a has only been applied to a few, but infamous,
his representatives.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
22. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10)(b) (McKinney 1982). Under section 632-a, a
person found not guilty as a result of a defense of a mental disease or defect was deemed
to be convicted. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(5) (McKinney 1982).
23. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
24. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
25. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney 1982). The Board was required to
publish a legal notice, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the crime
was committed, every six months for five years from the date the escrowed funds were
received to inform all victims that such funds were available. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-
a(2) (McKinney 1982).
26. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney 1982). The statute prioritized the grant-
ing of claims for money contained in the escrow account as follows: first, claims for
legal representation; second, subrogation claims of the state; third, civil judgments for the
victims of the crime; fourth, judgments for others with lawful claims including state or
local tax authorities; and last, any remaining money for the person accused or convicted
of the crime. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1 1) (McKinney 1982). Furthermore, if five years
had elapsed from the establishment of the escrow account and no claims had been filed
against the convicted person, the money was to be returned to such individual or to his
or her legal representative. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(4) (McKinney 1982). This subsec-
tion contradicted with the definition of a person convicted of a crime. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
19941
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cases since its enactment. 27 However, the constitutionality of sec-
tion 632-a was not challenged successfully until publishing house
Simon & Schuster, Inc. ("Simon & Schuster") prevailed in its ac-
tion before the United States Supreme Court.28 In 1981, Simon &
Schuster bought the rights to Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family
("Wiseguy"), a book based on the life of former organized crime
associate, Henry Hill.29 Published in 1986, the book described a
number of crimes committed by Hill, most of which did not result
in convictions.30  Pursuant to section 632-a, the Crime Victims
Board ordered Simon & Schuster to turn over copies of all con-
tracts entered into with Hill to determine if the contracts were the
type covered by the crime victimization statute. 31 The Board fur-
ther ordered Simon & Schuster to suspend all remaining payments
to Hill.32
After reviewing the book and the payment contracts between
Hill and Simon & Schuster, the Crime Victims Board determined
that the proceeds from Wiseguy resulted from the commission of
crimes and that Simon & Schuster had violated section 632-a by
failing to turn over all contracts to the Board.33 The Board ordered
Simon & Schuster to turn over payments owed to Hill so that this
money could be held in escrow for the benefit of crime victims.
34
The Board also ordered Hill to turn over the money he had already
27. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1. Some notable cases include: John Wojtowicz,
whose bank robbery was depicted in the film Dog Day Afternoon; Salvador Agron, the
"Capeman Killer," who killed two Manhattan teenagers; Jack Henry Abbott, who was
convicted of killing an aspiring actor; and Jean Harris, who was convicted of killing Dr.
Herman Tarnower. Id.
28. See infra part I.B.2.
29. 'Son of Sam' Laws Rightly Reversed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at A30. The
book Wiseguy later formed the basis for the motion picture Goodfellas. Id.
30. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 506 (1991).
31. Id. at 507.
32. Id.
33. Id. Although Simon & Schuster turned over the contracts to the Crime Victims
Board pursuant to a request, their initial failure to voluntarily do so placed them in viola-
tion of section 632-a.
34. id.
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received.35
1. The Lower Court Decisions
In 1987, Simon & Schuster brought an action against the Crime
Victims Board in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, alleging that section 632-a violated the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 6 The district court
rejected the constitutional challenge and upheld the law.37 The
court reasoned that although section 632-a made it more difficult
for publishers to publish books with the assistance of criminal
sources, it did not prohibit speech.38 The statute merely prevented
the convicted criminal from receiving any proceeds until the vic-
tims were provided with the opportunity for compensation. 39 The
court found that the interest of compensating victims for their suf-
fering was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and any
"burden on free expression [was] merely incidental." 4
The court examined the statute under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of review set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien.4' The district court stated that under
0 'Brien, a "sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
35. id.
36. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724
F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916
F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
37. 724 F. Supp. 170.
38. id. at 176. In rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment challenge the court stated,
"[tihe statute provides fair notice to those to whom it applies, it provides guidelines for
compliance, and ... the statute does not inhibit the exercise of basic constitutional free-
doms." Id. at 180.
39. Id. at 179.
40. id. at 177.
41. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The intermediate
standard set forth in O'Brien requires that the following criteria be met for a statute to
be deemed constitutional under the First Amendment: (1) it must be enacted within the
constitutional power of the government; (2) it must further an important or substantial
governmental interest; (3) the interest must be unrelated to speech; and (4) the restriction
does no more than is necessary to serve the governmental interest. 391 U.S. at 376.
19941
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Amendment freedoms., 4' The court found that section 632-a did
not prohibit expressive activity; rather, it was limited to the non-
expressive element of recollecting the crime, namely, receiving a
profit.4 3 Therefore, the court held that the statute was constitutional
because the restriction did no more than was necessary to serve the
state's interest in compensating crime victims.'
In 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court,45 but disagreed
with the lower court's utilization of the O'Brien test.46 The court
of appeals concluded that since the New York statute directly bur-
dened the speech of those who wanted to sell stories based on the
crimes they committed, the application of a strict scrutiny standard
of review was required.47 The statute was content-based, and "for
the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 48
Despite finding that the statute restricted speech, the court held
that section 632-a was constitutional under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard.49 The court found that the state had a compelling interest in
ensuring that criminals did not profit from their crimes at the ex-
pense of victims who deserved compensation.5° The court also
found that the statute was narrowly tailored to the state's interest
in delaying the criminals' receipt of the proceeds from their stories
until victims were fully compensated." The court, therefore, held
42. 724 F. Supp. at 178 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
43. Id. at 178-79.
44. Id. at 179.
45. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990).
46. Id. at 781.
47. Id.at 781-82.
48. Id. at 782 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983)).
49. Id. at 783. However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Jon 0. Newman found that
the statute did not survive strict scrutiny because it was both underinclusive and
overinclusive. Id. at 786-87 (Newman, J. dissenting).
50. Id. at 783.
51. Id. at 782-83. "The First Amendment right to speak is restricted only as a conse-
quence of [a criminal author's] inability to profit until the victim is compensated." Id.
at 783.
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that section 632-a was constitutional.
2. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
In an unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.52 Although the Court
applied the same standard of strict scrutiny as had the court of
appeals,5 3 it held that the statute failed to meet that standard. Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that "[a]
statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if
it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of
their speech., 54 The Court found section 632-a to be content-based
legislation because it singled out the income received as a result of
the expressive activity of a wrongdoer, without placing any such
burden on any other income.55
In order to justify the differential treatment of non-criminal and
criminal authors imposed by section 632-a, the Court determined
that the state must show that such content-based legislation serves
a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.56 The Court recognized that New York had a compelling
state interest in compensating crime victims as well as ensuring
that criminals do not profit from their crimes." The Court stated,
however, that the Crime Victims Board "cannot explain why the
State should have any greater interest in compensating victims from
the proceeds of such 'storytelling' than from any of the criminal's
For a more detailed discussion of the lower courts' decisions, see Jeanne E. Dugan,
Comment, Crime Doesn't Pay-Or Does It?: Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 65
ST. JoHN's L. REV. 981 (1991); Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Note, Simon and
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment
Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075 (1991).
52. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Justice Thomas had not yet been appointed to the Court
during oral arguments and therefore took no part in the decision).
53. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
54. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct.
1438, 1443-1444 (1991)).
55. Id. at 508.
56. Id. at 509 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987)).
57. Id. at 509-10.
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other assets. ' 8 The Court held that the statute unconstitutionally
singled out particular speech and placed a financial burden on it.5 9
The Court further determined that section 632-a was "signifi-
cantly overinclusive" and therefore was not narrowly tailored to the
state's objective of compensating victims.6° The statute's broad
definition of a "person convicted of a crime' 6' enabled the state to
seize the proceeds of authors who had been convicted of crimes as
well as those authors who had never been convicted but had merely
admitted to having committed crimes. 2 The Court noted that this
broad definition would have attached the proceeds of such authors
as Henry Thoreau and Martin Luther King, Jr., both of whom ad-
mitted to committing crimes for which they were never convicted.63
Therefore, section 632-a was not narrowly tailored to the objective
of compensating crime victims, and the statute was declared uncon-
stitutional."
Because the Supreme Court was limited to the facts before it
in Simon & Schuster, it did not address the constitutionality of
provisions found in many other states' crime victimization stat-
utes. 5 Despite the Supreme Court's decision, a number of states
continue to have laws that are virtually identical to New York's
"Son of Sam" statute. 66 Other states, however, have amended their
laws in an attempt to comply with the Court's decision in Simon
& Schuster.67
58. Id. at 510.
59. Id. at 508.
60. Id. at 511.
61. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
62. 112S. Ct. at511.
63. The Court also cited the works of such authors as Malcolm X, Emma Goldman,
Sir Walter Raleigh, Jesse Jackson, and Bertrand Russell. Id.
64. Id. at 512. The Court did not explicitly object to the provision deeming a person
found not guilty as a result of a mental disease or defect as a convicted person. See supra
note 22.
65. Id. "The Federal Government and many of the States have enacted statutes
designed to serve purposes similar to that served by the Son of Sam law. Some of these
statutes may be quite different from New York's and we have no occasion to determine
the constitutionality of these other laws." Id.
66. See statutes cited supra note 13.
67. See statutes cited supra note 12.
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C. The Amended New York Crime Victimization Statute
After the ruling of Simon & Schuster, the New York legislature
significantly revised and amended the state's crime victimization
statute.68 Designed to "recapture for crime victims much of what
was intended for them" under the original "Son of Sam" statute,
the amended statute focuses on the profits of crime rather than the
speech of criminals. 69 In describing the new law, a co-sponsor of
the legislation, former Assemblyman Alan G. Hevesi, stated that
speech was protected in the amended statute, but profiting from the
70crime was not.
Under section 632-a of the amended statute, any entity which
"contracts for, pays, or agrees to pay, any profit from a crime...
to a person charged with or convicted of that crime" shall give
notice to the Crime Victims Board of the payment or the obligation
to pay as soon as it becomes aware that the payment is intended as
a profit from committing a crime. 7  Thus, unlike the original stat-
ute which limited the forfeiture of the proceeds to any money
earned as a result of First Amendment activity, the amended statute
removes all specific references to First Amendment activities.72
68. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982).
69. 1992 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 382 (memorandum of Assemblyman Alan G. Hevesi).
Immediately after its enactment, the statute was criticized by the New York Civil Liber-
ties Union ("NYCLU"). Gary Spencer, Revised 'Son-of-Sam' Law Signed by Governor
Cuomo, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1992, at 1; see Conrad, supra note 15, at 45-47. The NYCLU
claimed that the new bill's focus on the profits of a crime "produces the same constitu-
tional infirmity as in the original." Spencer, supra, at 1. However, Senator Gold, who
also sponsored the new law, defended the amended statute when he stated, "[tihis law is
for the common criminals. If they win a lottery or receive money from a relative, the
court can step in and protect the victim. Reparations and restitution will help restore the
balance of justice." Stacy Shelton, New Law Curbs Inmates' Book, Movie Profits,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1992, at 18.
70. 1992 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 382 (memorandum of Assemblyman Alan G. Hevesi);
Sam Howe Verhovek, Pact in Albany Limits Profits of Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
1992, at BI. Upon signing the bill into law on July 24, 1992, Governor Cuomo com-
mented that it "implements broadly, wisely and fairly a vision of essential justice between
those who have been hurt, and those who have hurt them." New York Enacts Amended
"Son of Sam" Law, 14 ENT. L. REP. 11 (Apr. 1993).
71. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
72. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
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Furthermore, "profits from the crime" is now defined as: (1) any
property obtained through income generated from the commission
of the crime; (2) any property obtained or income generated from
the sale or conversion or exchange of proceeds of the crime; and
(3) any property or income generated as a result of having commit-
ted the crime." Therefore, the statute reaches the proceeds of a
crime generated from any source.
Moreover, the revised statute deleted the definition in the origi-
nal statute of "person convicted of a crime," which the Supreme
Court had declared unconstitutional. 74 The Court had held the defi-
nition to be overinclusive because it enabled the state to reach the
proceeds earned by an individual never convicted of a crime and
therefore was not narrowly tailored to the state's objectives.75
Currently, a "person convicted of a crime" is undefined.76
Finally, although Simon & Schuster did not specifically require
that the Crime Victims Board refrain from escrowing crime pro-
ceeds, the Board no longer maintains escrow accounts." The
Board is responsible for notifying all known victims of the exis-
tence of such profits earned by the criminal defendant.78 Crime
victims, under the amended statute, continue to have the right to
bring a civil cause of action to recover money damages from a
person convicted of a crime. 79 The amended New York statute is
LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
73. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
74. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a(10) (McKinney 1982).
75. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
76. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994).
77. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982).
78. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). The Crime Victims
Board shall continue to publish a legal notice in a newspaper of general circulation, once
every six months, for three years, in an attempt to notify all unknown victims. Compare
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(5)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2)
(McKinney 1982) (publish a notice once every six months for five years).
79. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982). Crime victims now have seven years instead of five
to bring a civil action to recover money damages against a person convicted of the crime.
Compare N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 213-b (McKinney Supp. 1994) with N.Y. EXEC.
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constitutional under the Simon & Schuster decision because the
statute no longer singles out speech and places a financial burden
on it.8°
II. PROVISIONS COMMON TO CRIME VICTIMIZATION STATUTES
The majority of crime victimization statutes currently in effect
contain similar procedural provisions, none of which were contest-
ed in Simon & Schuster. Almost all crime victimization statutes
specifically require that the crime victim make a civil claim to
recover any money judgment against the convicted individual.' In
LAW § 632-a(2) (McKinney 1982). The new law provides an additional three-year statute
of limitations for those individuals who do not discover the profits generated by the crime
until after the original seven-year statute of limitations has lapsed. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
632-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Victims now may recover during a criminal proceed-
ing without having to file a civil action. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1994). Further, judges have the authority to order restitution and reparation. N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1994).
80. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
Former New York Attorney General Robert Abrams recently filed a lawsuit under
the revised statute to set aside the profits from a movie deal based on the crimes of
Thomas Grasso who was convicted in New York for killing an eighty-two year old
woman and sentenced to death in Oklahoma for the murder of his eighty-seven year old
neighbor. Nicholas Goldberg, Slay Profit Deplored, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1993, at 22.
This could be the first application of the amended statute.
Grasso and his attorney, Johnie O'Neal, sold their movie rights for one dollar each
to an agent, Tim Oliver. Id. Abrams alleged that Grasso violated New York State's "Son
of Sam" law by selling his rights for less than fair value so he could prevent the victim's
families from claiming any of the proceeds. Jerry Gray, Political Notes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1993, § 1, at 50. Oliver had indicated that he planned to make millions of
dollars from the stories pertaining to Grasso's crimes. Goldberg, supra, at 22. O'Neal
indicated that he should be reimbursed for his "expenses" from any money that is earned
as a result of the "Grasso" story. Tom Mumane, Grasso Attorney Inches Off Promise
Made on ABC's "Day 1", UPI, Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, UPI
file. O'Neal argues that the New York lawsuit should not apply to him because he is
acting under Oklahoma law and, regardless of which state's law he acts under, the "Son
of Sam" law only applies to criminals and not their attorneys. Id. Abrams, who has
since resigned from the Attorney General's Office, had been investigating to determine
whether the law also applies to those who profit from their association with criminals.
See id.
81. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(c) (1990); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(B)(2) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(c)(1) (Michie
1987); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225(9)(c) (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-
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addition, most states require that criminal defendants remit the
proceeds earned as a result of their criminal activities to the state
so that it can hold the money in an escrow account for the benefit
of crime victims.8
2
201(1) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 9103(a) (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(3) (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-84 (Supp. 1992);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 145/3 (Smith-Hurd
1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(5) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7319(b)
(1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:1832(B) (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(e)(2) (Supp. 1993);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
780.768(18)(3)(b) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(4b) (West Supp.
1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-7(2) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14)(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(1)(d) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 217.007(1) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(B) (Michie 1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney Supp.
1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.04(c) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 17(c) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(3)(b) (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 180-7.18(a) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3(c) (Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-3 (1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(b) (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 17
(West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5(1)(b) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
368.21(4)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-40-112(f) (1988). But see
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to -1841 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (no specific provision).
82. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(a) (1990); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(B) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(2) (Michie 1987);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(9)(b) (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201(1)
(1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
9103(a) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(2) (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 351-82 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para.
145/3 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(2) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 74-7319(a) (1992); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1832(B) (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(c)(7)
(Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 780.768(18)(2) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.68(2a) (West Supp.
1994); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-38-7 (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A)
(Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(A) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(2) (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18(a) (1990); R.L GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-3(A) (Supp. 1993); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
28A-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(b) (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
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A majority of crime victimization statutes also have a provision
requiring the appropriate state agency to notify crime victims as to
the existence of the escrowed funds.83 Some states require that the
appropriate state agency publish a legal notice in a newspaper of
general circulation once every six months for five years.84 Other
states, however, require a notice to be published for a shorter peri-
od of time85 or have no notice provision.86 Some states also require
8309, § 16 (West Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5(1) (1992); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1992);
WYO. STAT. § 1-40-112 (1988). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1993)
(lien attaches in favor of the state); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-82 (Supp. 1992) (50 percent
of the proceeds go to the legal representation of the criminal defendant and fifty percent
go the crime victims fund); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1832(B) (West 1982) (75 percent
of the proceeds go to the benefit of crime victims and 25 percent go to the state victims
treasury); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.265 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993) (the legislature
repealed the section requiring that any proceeds received by the defendant be placed into
a state fund); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993) (money is subject to
forfeiture).
83. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(b) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-
31(f) (Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(2) (1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
764(a)-(c) (Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986) (identify all known and publish a notice every six
months for five years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(D) (West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 180-7.18(c) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.220 (West 1992).
85. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(c) (1989) (notice shall be published once
a year for five years); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(d) (Michie 1987) (notice shall be
published once a year for four years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 145/5 (Smith-Hurd
1992) (board shall notify all known victims and publish a notice once a year for five
years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1834 (West 1982) (notice shall be published once
every six months for two years); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992)
(notice shall be published once every six months for three years); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.68(3) (West Supp. 1994) (all attempts will be made to notify known victims and
a notice shall be published); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-7(2) (Supp. 1993) (notice shall
be published once every four months for one year); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(5)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1994) (notice shall be published once every six months for three years);
OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(4) (Supp. 1992) (notice shall be published once a year for five
years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-8 (Supp. 1993) (notice shall be published once every
six months for three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-4 (1988) (notice shall
be published once a year for five years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5(7) (1992) (notice
shall be published once every six months for six years from the date the money is re-
ceived); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 949.01(3) (West Supp. 1992) (notice shall be published once
every six months for three years).
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that the crime victims be notified directly by the respective state
81agencies.
The statute of limitations for bringing a cause of action against
a criminal defendant also varies from state to state. A number of
states require that a cause of action for a money judgment be
brought within five years of the establishment of the escrow ac-
count;88 within five years from the date that the crime was commit-
86. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp.
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-201 to -202 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
218 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
351-81 to -88 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-
38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to -1841 (1987 & Supp. 1992);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06
(Anderson 1993); TENN. CODE AN. §§ 29-13-201 to -208 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
87. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-81 (1991) (board of adjustment shall notify all crime
victims); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 145/5 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (Treasurer shall notify
all known victims and publish a notice once a year for five years); IOWA CODE ANN. §
910.15(3) (West 1994) (all reasonable efforts shall be made to notify crime victims); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 74-7320 (1992) (crime victims compensation board shall notify crime vic-
tims); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 764(a)-(c) (Supp. 1993) (notice shall be mailed to all
known victims and a notice shall be published once every six months for five years);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611 A.68(3) (West Supp. 1994) (all attempts will be made to notify
known victims and a notice shall be published); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(2)(e)
(1993) (law enforcement agencies and officials shall take reasonable care to inform
victims); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.005 (Michie 1986) (state may prepare and dissemi-
nate information regarding the benefits available to crime victims); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
52:4B-28 (West 1986) (identify all known and publish a notice once every six months for
five years); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 10(f) (West Supp. 1993) (local law
enforcement agency shall inform crime victims); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-115 (1988) (law
enforcement agency shall exercise reasonable care to notify crime victims).
88. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(E) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-
201(1) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(c) (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-
31(a)(3) (Michie 1990); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para.
145/3 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(8) (West 1994); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 346.165(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a) (Supp.
1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (18)(2) (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611A.68(4)(b)(3) (West Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon
Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1838 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West
1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(F) (Michie 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(c)
(West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(3)(b) (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
180-7.18(a) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-3 (1988); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 18 (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21 (Michie
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ted;89 or within five years from the date that charges were filed
against the criminal defendant.9° The remainder of the crime vic-
timization statutes have varying statutory periods for bringing a
claim against a criminal defendant.9 Some states also prioritize the
distribution of the proceeds earned by a convicted individual. 92
Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.220 (West 1992).
89. See ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West
1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
13-202(b) (1980);
90. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308(c)(2) (Michie 1987).
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(c) (1990) (ten years from the date the crime was
committed or the identity of the perpetrator is discovered); CAL. CIV. CODE §
2225(a)(9)(b) (West Supp. 1994) (five years from the establishment of the account or date
of conviction whichever is later); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-88(2) (ten years from the date
of the last judgment obtained by a victim or a victim's representative) (Supp. 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(b) (1992) (a claim must be filed within six months of notification
and further evidence must be provided within two years); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1833
(West 1982) (notice of intent to file a claim must be made within one year); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (three years from the establishment of the
account); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-38-7 (Supp. 1993) (one year from the establishment of
the account); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(d) (1993) (the statutory period is left up to
the discretion of the Division of Crime Control of the Department of Justice); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 217.007(1) (Michie Supp. 1993) (five years after the crime victim is legally
entitled to receive money); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994) (three
years from the discovery of the profits); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.04(B) (Anderson
1993) (three years from the establishment of the account); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-7
(Supp. 1993) (three years after the establishment of the account or after other compensa-
tion is made to the criminal defendant, whichever is later); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-
12.5(1)(b) (1992) (six years from the establishment of the account); WiS. STAT. ANN. §
949.165(8) (West Supp. 1992) (three years from the establishment of the account); WYO.
STAT. § 1-40-112(f) (1988) (five years from the date of an order for the purpose of
satisfying a civil judgment).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(f) (Supp. 1992) (distribution of the payments are
prioritized: (1) payment ordered by the Violent Crimes Compensation Board; (2) judg-
ment against the person; (3) subrogation claims; (4) civil judgment of victims; (5) other
judgment creditors; and (6) the convicted individual); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.512(2)(a)-
(d) (West Supp. 1993) (statute apportions the proceeds as follows: (a) 25 percent to the
dependents of a convicted felon; (b) 25 percent to the victim(s); (c) coverage of court
costs; (d) balance to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-
7320(b)(1)-(5) (1992) (if the individual is convicted, the money is used first to satisfy
claims by the victims; second, to pay any restitution ordered by the court; third, to pay
the defendant's state legal fees; fourth, any court costs are paid; fifth, to pay any addition-
al compensation; and sixth, any money remaining will be deposited in the state treasury);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.768(3)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1993) (the state apportions
the proceeds first for orders of restitution, second for civil judgments in favor of the
1994]
948 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Certain provisions found in various crime victimization statutes
would be found unconstitutional pursuant to the holding of Simon
& Schuster.93  These provisions will be discussed in the following
sections.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD DEFINITION OF A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
In Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court held that the defini-
tion of a "person convicted of a crime" in New York's original
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it had required the
forfeiture of proceeds of anyone who was accused of a crime or
anyone who voluntarily admitted to the commission of the crime,
regardless of whether that person was eventually convicted.94 In
rendering its decision, the Court noted that, under the original stat-
ute, a prominent figure who includes in his autobiography a recol-
lection of having stolen a worthless item as a youth would be sub-
ject to forfeiture of the proceeds.95 This indicated to the Court that
the statute was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tai-
victim and third to reimburse the state for incarcerating the individual); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:4B-30.(West 1986) (if the individual is convicted, the money is distributed as fol-
lows: (1) civil judgments of victims; (2) restitution orders; (3) judgment creditors; (4)
costs incurred by Violent Crimes Compensation Board; and (5) if after five years there
is any money remaining, it is deposited in escrow for use in satisfying claims filed pursu-
ant to the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of 1971"); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-
3(C)(l)-(8) (Supp. 1993) (claims against the fund shall be paid as follows: first, claims
by the state for representation of a defendant by a public defender or court appointed
attorney; second, costs incurred for investigation and prosecution of the crime; third,
claims by victims; fourth, claims by the state for recovery by an offender; fifth, civil
judgments in favor of a victim of a criminally responsible person; sixth, after the lapse
of the statutory period and satisfaction of subparagraphs one through five, one-half of the
money shall go to the violent crimes indemnity fund; seventh, claims by other creditors;
and eighth, claims by the criminally responsible person or a representative thereof); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 949.165(5)-(7) (West Supp. 1993) (the statute apportions the money first
paying for the legal representation of the individual; second, for satisfying the money
judgments of the victims; and third, for paying all legal fees and making restitution).
93. See discussion supra part I.B.2.
94. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501 (1991); see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
95. 112 S. Ct. at 512.
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lored to achieving the objective of compensating crime victims.96
Unlike New York, 97 three states that need to amend their stat-
utes to comply with the Supreme Court decision in Simon &
Schuster have not done so. Alaska, Rhode Island, and Utah have
failed to amend their statutes to comply with the Simon & Schuster
decision on this point.98 Although Alaska's current crime victim-
ization statute does not use the identical definition that the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional in Simon & Schuster," its definition
of "offender" is still significantly overbroad because it is defined
as a person who has committed a crime whether or not he or she
has been convicted.1°° Rhode Island's present statute overbroadly
defines a "criminally responsible person" as a convicted individual,
an individual who is found not guilty by reason of insanity, 01 or an
individual who has "voluntarily admitted the commission of such
offense."'1 2 Furthermore, the statute also sets forth an unconstitu-
tional provision for an "alleged criminally responsible person" as
one who has been indicted or against whom information has been
obtained but who has not yet been convicted or acquitted.
1 3
Utah's definition of "person convicted of a crime" is identical to
the definition in New York's original statute and is therefore un-
constitutional."
However, the majority of states satisfy the requirements set
forth by the Court in Simon & Schuster either (1) because they
have amended their statutes to delete any unconstitutionally broad
96. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
97. The New York legislature, in amending the original statute, deleted the definition
of a "person convicted of a crime." See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
98. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(d) (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25.1-2(d), (f)
(Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5(5)(b) (1992).
99. Compare N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(10) (McKinney 1982) with ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.61.020(d) (1990).
100. ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020(e)(1) (1990).
101. Notably, the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster did not object to a provision
deeming a person guilty by reason of insanity as a convicted person. See supra note 64.
102. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(d) (Supp. 1993).
103. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(f) (Supp. 1993).
104. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12.5(5)(b) (1992) with N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 632-a(10) (McKinney 1982).
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definition of a criminal defendant,°5 (2) because their current stat-
utes' definitions withstand strict scrutiny and thus require no modi-
fication, 1°6 or (3) because their current statutes contain no specific
definition of a criminal defendant. 10 7
Only two states besides New York have adequately amended
their statutes in compliance with the Simon & Schuster decision.
Delaware amended its crime victimization statute, altering the defi-
nition of "person convicted of a crime" to omit the language defin-
ing a person as convicted if he or she "voluntarily and intelligently
admitted the commission of a crime for which such person is not
prosecuted."''0 8 This original language was identical to that which
the Supreme Court determined was overbroad in Simon &
Schuster.10 9 Maryland also amended its statute to delete its over-
inclusive definition of a defendant as an individual who voluntarily
105. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9102(3) (Supp. 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 764(a)(2) (Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW. § 632-a (McKinney Supp. 1994).
106. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4201 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308
(Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
944.512(1) (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-30 (Michie 1990); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 910.15(1)(a) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1831(2)(B) (West 1982);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258A, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 IA.68(lc)
(West Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.045(14) (Vernon Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:4B-26 (West 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.01 (Anderson 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17(A) (West 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18(2)
(1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 14 (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-368.19 (Michie Supp. 1993).
107. The following statutes require only that the individual be convicted, but do not
provide any specific definition: See ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-4.1-201(1) (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218(a) (West 1985); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 351-82 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
725, para. 145/3 (Smith-Hurd 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a) (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 346.165(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
780.768(2) (West Supp. 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-38-9 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-9-104(d) (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
22-22(B) (Michie 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(2) (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-3 (1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(a) (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West
1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d)
(1988).
108. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9102(3) (Supp. 1992) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 9102(3) (1987); see generally Zavack, supra note 15, at 724.
109. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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admitted the commission of a crime without having been convicted
of that crime.10 In Maryland, "defendant" is now defined as an
individual charged with or convicted of a crime."' Both of these
amended statutes have definitions of a criminal defendant that are
narrowly tailored to the states' objective of compensating crime
victims and are therefore constitutional.
On the other hand, sixteen current statutes contain narrow defi-
nitions of a criminal defendant which comply with the Simon &
Schuster decision and, therefore, need not be amended." 2 For ex-
ample, under Minnesota law, "offender" is described as a "person
convicted of a crime or found not guilty of a crime by reason of
insanity."' 1 3  Iowa's crime victimization statute also contains a
definition consistent with the Supreme Court's decision." 4 Under
Iowa law, "convicted felon" is defined as "a person initially con-
victed, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, . . . either by a
court or jury trial or by entry of a guilty plea in court.""' Finally,
twenty states define criminal defendant merely as a person convict-
ed of a crime and thereby do not offend the Simon & Schuster
decision." 6 Thus, crime victimization statutes that do not reach
those individuals who are never convicted of a crime, as defined by
the specific statutes, are constitutional under Simon & Schuster.
IV. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTION
In Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court held that states cannot
place, a "financial disincentive only on speech of a particular con-
110. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(2) (Supp. 1993) with MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(2) (1992).
111. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(2) (Supp. 1993). Notably, section 764(d)(3)
requires that the money be returned to the criminal defendant upon acquittal. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 764(d)(3) (Supp. 1993). Therefore, it can be inferred that the individual
must ultimately be convicted to trigger the crime victimization statute.
112. See supra note 107.
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 IA.68(c) (West Supp. 1994). See supra note 102.
114. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(a) (West 1994). Iowa amended it statute on
other grounds. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
115. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(a) (West 1994).
116. See supra note 108.
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tent.." 7 The Supreme Court's decision, however, did not specifi-
cally address whether those statutes which make no reference to the
proceeds generated by First Amendment activities would be consid-
ered constitutional. It did imply, however, that a statute which did
not specifically single out the speech of a criminal defendant and
place a financial burden on it would be constitutional." 8 The Su-
preme Court found that New York had "a compelling interest in
compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but little if any
interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the
wrongdoer's speech about the crime." 119
A crime victimization statute which seizes the proceeds derived
from any and all sources would appear to be narrowly tailored to
achieving the state's objective of compensating crime victims.
Thus, it can be concluded that statutes that seize all proceeds re-
ceived from whatever source are constitutional. However, any
statute that singles out the speech of criminal authors solely be-
cause of its content and places a financial burden on it would be
declared unconstitutional. A majority of crime victimization stat-
utes single out the speech of criminal authors and place a financial
burden on it. 120 Some statutes, however, have been amended to
meet the "narrowly tailored" requirement set forth in Simon &
Schuster.1
21
117. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991).
118. See id. at 510; see also supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 511; see also Conrad, supra note 15, at 52 (states can solve the "narrowly
tailored" problem by reaching all of a criminal's assets regardless of the source);
Soderberg, supra note 15, at 662 (if the legislature had really been concerned about
compensating victims, they would seize all criminal profits rather than suppress speech);
Zavack, supra note 15, at 719 (proceeds should be seized from whatever source); Reed,
supra note 15, at 1068 (if we really want to punish someone who has been enriched as
a result of criminal activity, then extend the statute to all illegal profits however ob-
tained).
120. See statutes cited infra notes 123 and 134.
121. See infra note 142.
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A. Unamended, and Therefore Unconstitutional, Crime Victim-
ization Statutes
Similar to New York's original statute, the unamended statutes
of twenty-five states unconstitutionally single out the speech of a
criminal defendant and place a financial burden on it.122  All of
these statutes require the forfeiture of proceeds which are earned
by a criminal defendant by way of movie, book, article, radio or
television program, live entertainment of any kind, or from the
expression of such person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emo-
tions regarding such crime. 123 Furthermore, some statutes require
the forfeiture of proceeds that are earned also by way of tape re-
cording or phonograph record.124
For example, California singles out the speech of convicted
individuals in its definition of "materials."1 25 Like many "Son of
Sam" laws, Minnesota's statute specifically refers to First Amend-
ment activities in its definition of a contract entered into with a
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(9) (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-
201(1) (1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(1) (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 351-
81 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301(1) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319(a)
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.165(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258A, § 8 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.68(a) (West Supp.
1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-38-5 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-26 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22(A) (Michie
1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2969.02(A) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 17(A) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(1) (Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 180-7.18(a) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(a) (1980); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 16 (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.68.200 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-40-112 (1988).
123. See statutes cited supra note 123.
124. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31(a)(1) (Michie 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
38-5 (Supp. 1993) (also includes photographs); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.275(1) (Supp.
1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18(a) (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
28A-1 (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 16 (West Supp. 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West 1992); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 949.165(2) (West Supp.
1992).
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(6) (West Supp. 1994). "All proceeds from ... the
sale of materials that include or are based on the story of a felony for which such convict-
ed felon was convicted, shall be subject to [forfeiture]." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2225(a)(9)(b)
(West Supp. 1994). For further discussion, see Zavack, supra note 15.
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criminal defendant. 12 6 Its criteria for determining whether proceeds
earned under contract should be forfeited, however, are different
from those of most states. Most states simply require that all of
the proceeds be turned over to the appropriate state agency. 127
Minnesota is unusual because its statute provides that if a criminal
defendant enters into a contract within ten years after conviction,
the crime victims reparations board must be notified and the money
must be paid over to the board according to the following terms:
(a) if the crime occurred in this state, the person shall pay
to the board 100 percent of the money owed under the con-
tract; (b) if the crime occurred in another jurisdiction hav-
ing a law applicable to the contract which is substantially
similar to this section, this section does not apply, and the
person must not pay to the board any of the money owed
under the contract; and (c) in all other cases, the person
shall pay to the board that percentage of money owed under
the contract which can fairly be attributed to commerce in
this state with respect to the subject matter of the con-
tract. 1
28
Pennsylvania's crime victimization statute not only places a
financial burden on criminal authors because of the content of their
speech, but also has an unusual provision permitting the accused to
make a voluntary request to the state's crime victims compensation
board that the crime victim be compensated. 129 However, the law
requires that the accused be criminally convicted before such com-
pensation is awarded. 130
Rhode Island singles out the speech of criminal authors by
requiring that any proceeds derived from the commercial exploita-
tion of the activities of a criminally responsible person or an al-
leged criminally responsible person be turned over to the general
126. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(a) (West Supp. 1994).
127. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law Co-
op. Supp. 1992).
128. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611 A.68(2a) (West Supp. 1994).
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18(a) (1990).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-7.18(a) (1990).
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treasurer to be placed in the criminal royalties fund. 13 1 "Commer-
cial exploitation" is defined as "any publication, reenactment, dra-
matization, interview, depiction, explanation or expression through
any medium of communication which is undertaken for financial
consideration."132
B. Amended Statutes That Do Not Comply With the Simon &
Schuster Decision
Two states unsuccessfully amended their crime victimization
statutes in an attempt to comply with the Simon & Schuster deci-
sion.133 Louisiana also attempted to revise its crime victimization
statute to comply with the Simon & Schuster decision, but the leg-
islative session ended before an agreement could be reached as to
the wording of the amendment which, inter alia, removed all refer-
ences to First Amendment activities. 13 4 Currently, Louisiana re-
quires that the proceeds received from the First Amendment ac-
tivities of a convicted individual be forfeited.'35 Therefore, Louisi-
ana's current statute is unconstitutional Under Simon & Schuster.
Although, the Delaware legislature amended its statute, 136 it did
not revise the section relating to those First Amendment activities
which require forfeiture. 137 Therefore, Delaware's amended statute
still unconstitutionally singles out the speech of criminal authors
and places a financial burden on it.' 38
Finally, despite the Simon & Schuster decision, the Nevada
legislature amended its statute and added specific references to
131. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-25,l-3(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993).
132. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25.1-2(b) (Supp. 1993).
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a) (Supp. 1992; 1993 LA. SEss. LAW SERV.
157 (West); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.007(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
134. 1993 LA. SESS. LAW SERV. 157 (West).
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1832(A) (West 1982).
136. See supra note 108.
137. The only change the legislature made in section 9103(a) was to require that the
individual be convicted, rather than that he or she be merely "accused or convicted."
Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a) (Supp. 1992) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 9103(a) (1987).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103(a) (Supp. 1992).
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First Amendment activities. 139  "Material" is now defined as "a
book, magazine or newspaper article, movie, film, videotape, sound
recording, interview or appearance on a television or radio station
and live presentations of any kind."' 4
C. Amended Crime Victimization Statutes That Comply With
the Simon & Schuster Decision
Three states besides New York appear to have successfully
amended their crime victimization statutes to comply with the hold-
ing in Simon & Schuster.'4 Iowa's amended statute does not spe-
cifically single out the speech of criminal authors. 142 Instead, it
defines "proceeds" in a much broader sense as the fruits of the
crime received from whatever source. 143 "Fruits of the crime" is
defined as any profit which, were it not for the crime, would not
have been received without the commission of the crime.144 Iowa's
statute as currently written would survive a constitutional challenge
because it does not single out the speech of convicted individuals
and place a financial burden thereon. Therefore, the statute is
narrowly tailored to the state's objective of compensating crime
victims and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes.
139. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.007(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) with
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.265 (Michie 1986).
140. NEV. REV. STAT.. ANN. § 217.007(3)(a) (Michie Supp. 1993). The statute
provides that a crime victim is entitled to commence an action against a person convicted
of a felony who has received proceeds "for any contribution to any material that is based
upon or substantially related to the felony which was perpetrated against the victim."
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.007(1) (Michie Supp. 1993).
141. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368 (Michie Supp. 1993).
142. IOWA CODE ANN § 910.15 (West 1994). For further analysis of Iowa's law, see
Zavack, supra note 15, at 726.
143. IOWA CODE ANN § 910.15(1)(e) (West 1994).
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(d) (West 1994). Furthermore, "convicted felon"
is defined as a person initially convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of a
felony by a court or jury or by entry of a guilty plea. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(a)
(West 1994). "Representative of a convicted felon" is defined as "any person or entity
receiving proceeds by designation of that convicted felon, or on behalf of that convicted
felon, or in the stead of that convicted felon, whether by the felon's designation or by
operation of law." IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.15(1)(t) (West 1994).
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Prior to 1992, Maryland's statute limited the activities that
trigger forfeiture to First Amendment activities. 145 Currently, the
statute attacks any profits directly or indirectly received from the
crime, including, but not limited to, First Amendment activities
under its definition of "notoriety of crimes contract."' 146 This defi-
nition includes a contract made with a defendant with respect to:
(1) First Amendment activities such as a book, movie or television
program; (2) an expression of defendant's thoughts regarding a
crime involving or causing injury, death or property loss as a direct
result of the crime; or (3) proceeds or profits that directly or indi-
rectly result from the crime, sentence, or the notoriety thereof.1 47
Despite specific references to First Amendment activities, since the
Maryland statute is not limited to those activities, the courts should
find it is constitutional under Simon & Schuster.
Virginia's amended statute does not place a financial burden on
convicted individuals because of the content of their speech.148
Rather, the statute requires that the proceeds or profits of a crime
from any source received as a direct or indirect result be forfeited
after a hearing.149 Because the Virginia statute forfeits the proceeds
received from whatever source and does not specifically single out
the speech of criminal authors, it is consistent with the Simon &
Schuster decision.
CONCLUSION
From a moral standpoint, the reasoning behind the original New
York statute is sound. Convicted felons should not be able to prof-
145. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(b) (1992).
146. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(5) (Supp. 1993). The defendant shall have
the opportunity to rebut the presumption that the contract is a notoriety of crimes contract
and the attorney general shall render his or her decision no later than 180 days after
receiving the contract. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 764(c)(2), (3) (Supp. 1993).
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764(a)(5) (Supp. 1993).
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993). Should the profits come
from a depiction of the individual's crime, the statute requires that an integral part of the
work be a depiction of the crime or discussion of the defendant's thoughts or emotions
in order to be subject to forfeiture. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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it from their crimes until their victims are duly compensated. By
permitting them to depict stories based on their crimes and in turn
receive compensation, society is, in effect, condoning the crimes
they have committed. From a legal perspective, however, the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster is valid. New
York's original statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve the
dual objectives of compensating crime victims and preventing crim-
inals from profiting from their crimes. It went beyond what was
necessary to protect victims of crimes. It needlessly singled out
First Amendment speech and overbroadly implicated those merely
accused of crimes.
Crime victimization statutes are a valuable part of our criminal
justice system. Even under the Simon & Schuster decision, these
statutes can be tailored so as to not violate the First Amendment.
Therefore, the crime victimization statutes of various states should
be amended so that they no longer single out the speech of crimi-
nal defendants and place a financial burden on it. Further, three
states need to redefine or omit their definitions of a criminal defen-
dant. The statutes should seize any and all proceeds or property
earned by convicted individuals as a result of their crimes for the
specific purposes of compensating crime victims and preventing
criminal defendants from profiting from their crimes. In such in-
stances, both the crime victims' compensation and the protections
afforded by the First Amendment are preserved.
Debra A. Shields*
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